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Introduction and Background 
                                                             
1 Corresponding author. Authors are grateful for valuable input from colleagues at Dansk Energi, PwC, Cambridge University. Authors are 
further grateful for excellent research support by Dr. Jun Hoo, Jos Borger and Mark Jonker. Any remaining errors or omissions are the 
responsibility of the authors. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Advisory N.V., any of the PricewaterhouseCoopers network of firms or any other individual with which they are 
associated. 
 2 
 
In the past 30 years electricity markets around the world have been radically transformed. We can 
observe, inter alia, the following: markets opened, competitors emerged, businesses rationalized, 
incumbents combined, technologies advanced and customers experimented on. Power utilities have 
evolved into a dramatically divergent industry from their long-dated legacy as integrated monopoly 
utilities. Many of the changes have been initiated by significant institutional reforms, such as 
horizontal and vertical unbundling of integrated utilities, the introduction of independent incentive 
regulation, and the privatisation of publicly owned electricity assets. At the same time the way power 
is produced and consumed is changing, with increasing amounts of decentralised and distributed 
intermittent renewable sources. Traditionally passive uni-directional distribution networks are 
becoming increasingly active with bi-directional power flows. 
 
Separating electricity distribution and transmission networks – considered to be the remaining 
natural monopolies – from those activities now considered to be competitive, such as generation, 
trading, and supply, has been a key component of these reforms. 
 
The most common form of separation – in OECD countries - has been to create legally separate 
entities – within the original utility – that own and operate the networks with an external and 
independent regulator that ensures grid access is non-discriminatory, transparent, and tariffs are 
cost-reflective (see Kufeoglu et al., 2018). The more extreme form of separation is to require 
ownership unbundling and to prohibit the networks to be (majority) owned by players with 
competitive power market activities. 
 
There is an emerging consensus that mandating ownership separation is preferable at the 
transmission level – either of both assets and operation (Transmission System Operators, TSO), or at 
least the operation of the assets (Independent System Operators, ISO) (see Chawla and Pollitt, 2013). 
The World Bank recommends that the system operator is independent and does not have financial 
interests in market participants and vice versa2. The European Commission states that transmission 
ownership separation is the preferred option3. FERC (US federal regulator) implemented open access 
to transmission facilities in 1996. In 1999 FERC encouraged the formation of Regional Transmission 
Operators (RTOs) that serve as regional system operators with Order 20004.  
 
                                                             
2 World Bank (2002). 
3 European Commission (2009), Third Energy Package. The Third Energy Package includes rules on the unbundling of transmission 
system operators from energy suppliers and producers in order to ensure non-discriminatory access of all suppliers and producers to 
electricity and gas transmission networks.  
4 FERC Order No. 2000 requires that each public utility that owns, operates, or controls facilities for the transmission of electric energy in 
interstate commerce make certain filings with respect to forming and participating in a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO). Order 
No. 2000 also codifies minimum characteristics and functions that a transmission entity must satisfy to be considered an RTO.  
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At the distribution level, there has been a debate on the costs and benefits of ownership separation. 
Although there are several examples of voluntary ownership separation of distribution networks (e.g. 
Western Power Distribution, UK Power Networks and Northern Powergrid in the UK), there have 
only been two countries to have forced this in their markets. New Zealand introduced distribution 
network ownership unbundling in 1998 and the Netherlands in 2009. In both of these electricity 
markets the aim was to improve competition, increase quality, and reduce costs by increasing 
efficiency.  
  
The discussion over the advantages and disadvantages of mandated ownership separation of 
distribution networks is topical given the changes to the role of distribution networks in the energy 
transition. According to a recent survey, 72 percent of European distribution executives think that 
their companies will become more service-focused than asset-oriented. They see their future role as 
data hubs to facilitate market access5. The emergence of “platforms”, where distribution networks 
play a central role connecting and facilitating supply and demand, will require a different regulatory 
perspective on the DSO (Pollitt, 2008). In Denmark the government is considering ownership 
unbundling of DSOs and is currently examining its potential effects on retail competition (Danish 
Energy Agency, 2014)6. The sheer size of this part of the value chain and the number of companies 
involved, warrants a closer look at the pros and cons of forced ownership unbundling. Recent analysis 
shows there are approximately 7600 distribution system operators in 175 countries, but that only 41 
of those countries have a legally separated the distribution company7.  
 
Ownership unbundling of the distribution network is a complicated and challenging process – 
especially when imposed (i.e. forced) simultaneously on all market players. Three aspects need to be 
taken into account: (i) the transaction costs of unbundling (e.g. direct or contract renegotiation 
costs), (ii) the dynamic efficiency effect on costs and quality (e.g. loss of vertical economies versus 
gain in management focus), and (iii) the effect on the degree of concentration in competitive 
segments (i.e. the reduction in the number of competitors versus the breaking up of incumbency).  
 
Therefore, the question is whether ownership unbundling at distribution level is the right next step 
for those countries that have already legally separated their distribution networks. For those 
countries that have not yet legally separated their distribution networks, the question is whether 
forced ownership separation should be considered as opposed to legal separation.   
                                                             
5  Vlerick Business School (2016). 
6 Danish Energy Agency (2014), pages 74-75: “An analysis of disadvantages and benefits associated with ownership unbundling 
compared to current regulation should be prepared in good time before the next licence period. The analysis, which must be available in 
good time before deciding on new licences to the distribution companies for the period after 2021-2024, should take into account relevant 
academic and legal issues, including the relationship to the provision in the constitution regarding expropriation.” [Translated from 
Danish by authors]. 
7 Küfeoğlu et al. (2018). 
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This paper uses data from both markets to assess whether distribution network ownership 
unbundling achieved what proponents argued, and discusses whether alternative policy measures 
could have achieved similar results at lower costs.  
 
Arguments for and against ownership unbundling of distribution networks 
According to its proponents, distribution ownership unbundling leads to increased retail competition 
and hence to a greater economic welfare for consumers (e.g. lower prices, higher service quality, fair 
network access and more innovation). It improves the quality of networks and the security of supply, 
because of more managerial focus, independence and increased investments. It increases market 
transparency, and thus improves regulatory effectiveness. Finally, distribution ownership unbundling 
improves efficiency and reduces costs, due to more focus, alignment of managerial incentives and 
lower cost of capital for the network company.  
 
According to opponents, distribution ownership unbundling increases the risk of consolidation 
among incumbents at the same horizontal level. It reduces coordination between networks and 
generation/ supply. It leads to the risk of less investment in generation and networks, due to a higher 
cost of capital and consequent reduced incentives to avoid grid failures. It results in high one-off 
transaction costs (financial and legal negotiations and settlements, i.e. reallocation of balance sheet, 
contractual obligations, roles and responsibilities, and organizational restructuring of the new 
separated entities) and increases structural costs due to loss of economies of scope. Finally, 
distribution ownership unbundling is not necessary, if effective competition policy and incentive 
based regulation is in place, which targets the promotion of competition, quality of service and lower 
network costs directly. 
 
No clear theoretical guidance on optimal scale or scope of firms 
The optimal scale and scope of a firm is highly firm specific, both the type of industry and history are 
significant in determining optimal scale and scope at any given time8. The wide range of scales and 
scopes observed in firms demonstrates this. Forcing simultaneous ownership unbundling of different 
activities can subsequently result in horizontal consolidation of separated activities, raising the 
possibility of increased concentration and reduced competition in the long run. There is very little 
evidence for the stability of forced separations lead to a reduction of long-run prices, in the presence 
of such horizontal mergers9. It is also not clear if ownership unbundling addresses the possible need 
to better align managerial incentives across the different activities10. 
 
                                                             
8 Hay & Liu (1997). 
9 See for example, Slade (1998). 
10 Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
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The theory supporting the positive impact of forced ownership unbundling is ambiguous and 
abstract: (i) optimal scale and scope is hard to identify and heavily dependent on market conditions 
and historical context, (ii) ownership unbundling might reduce the possibility of vertical restraints on 
competition, yet introduces the risk of horizontal foreclosure, and (iii) the existence of a smaller 
unbundled business might in principle sharpen managerial incentives, yet in practice subsequent 
mergers might lead to larger entities with greater principal agent problems. 
 
Literature on ownership unbundling non-supportive 
We have reviewed 60 papers relevant to ownership unbundling of electricity transmission and 
distribution over the period 1990 to today, of which 23 discuss the effects of (ownership) separation 
of distribution networks. We have developed a framework for assessing the degree of consensus on 
forced distribution ownership unbundling, looking at their overall ownership unbundling assessment 
and with respect to their assessment of the effect of unbundling following three indicators/ 
hypotheses: 
 
Competition in retail and generation markets hypothesis 
Ownership unbundling could increase competition among retailers and generators, resulting in lower 
retail margins, higher quality products and services, and more innovation. 
 
Quality of network infrastructure hypothesis 
Ownership unbundling could improve the quality of network infrastructure by increased investment 
and management focus, leading to an increase in security of supply and thus benefiting end-
consumers. 
 
Costs impact of unbundling hypothesis 
Ownership unbundling could result in large one-off transaction costs, possible loss of synergies and 
higher cost of capital on one hand, but it could lead to increased cost efficiency of networks due to 
better management focus. 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the 23 papers that discuss distribution network unbundling, and how 
the papers assess the impact of ownership unbundling on competition, quality and costs (in favour, 
inconclusive, not in favour, and not assessed). Table 2 provides a summary of the results from the 23 
papers. 
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Table 1: Distribution ownership unbundling papers 
Author(s) Country/Countries 
Em-
pirical 
Type of data Time Period 
Comp-
etition 
Quality Costs 
Vagliasindi & 
Besant-Jones 
(World Bank) 
(2013) 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Egypt, Indonesia, 
South Korea, Peru, South 
Africa, Turkey, Botswana, 
India, Jordan, Vietnam, 
Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda 
Yes 
Real/ 
Simulation 
1989-2009 - ~ N/A 
Growitsch et 
al. (2008) 
Finland, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, UK 
Yes Real 2002 N/A N/A - 
Mulder et al. 
(2005) 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, UK, Argentina, Chile, 
New Zealand 
No Theoretical 1999-2005 + ~ - 
Meyer (2011) EU, USA, New Zealand Yes Real 1971-2011 ~ N/A - 
Bertram & 
Twaddle 
(2005) 
New Zealand Yes Real 1994-2003 - N/A N/A 
Bertram 
(2006) 
New Zealand Yes Real 1984-2005 - - - 
Nillesen & 
Pollitt (2011) 
New Zealand Yes Real 1991-2007 - + + 
Shen & Yang 
(2012) 
New Zealand Yes Real 1996-2011 - - ~ 
Filippini & 
Wetzel (2014) 
New Zealand Yes 
Real/ 
Simulation 
1996-2011 + N/A + 
Deloitte 
(2005) 
Netherlands No Theoretical 1998-2004 N/A N/A - 
CPB (2006) Netherlands No Theoretical 1981-2005 N/A N/A ~ 
Baarsma et 
al. (2007) 
Netherlands No  Theoretical 1998-2006 ~ ~ - 
Kunneke & 
Fens (2007) 
Netherlands No Theoretical 1998-2006 + + - 
De Nooij & 
Baarsma 
(2009) 
Netherlands No Theoretical 1998-2009 ~ ~ - 
Mulder & 
Willems 
(2016) 
Netherlands Yes Real 2004-2014 ~ + N/A 
Greer (2008) US Yes Real 1997 N/A N/A - 
Meyer (2010) US Yes Real 2001-2008 N/A N/A - 
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Kwoka et al. 
(2010) 
US Yes Real 1994-2003 N/A N/A - 
Filippini et 
al. (2008) 
Switzerland Yes Real 1997-2005 N/A N/A - 
Fetz & 
Filippini 
(2010) 
Switzerland Yes Real 1997-2005 N/A N/A - 
Jara-Diaz et 
al. (2004) 
Spain Yes Real 1985-1996 N/A N/A - 
Arocena 
(2008) 
Spain Yes 
Real/ 
Simulation 
1990-2006 N/A N/A - 
Piacenza et 
al. (2005) 
Italy Yes Real 1994-2000 N/A N/A - 
+ In favour, - Not in favour, ~ Inconclusive 
 
Table 2: Summary of findings based on 23 papers 
Total Competition Quality Costs 
In favour 3 3 2 
Inconclusive 4 4 2 
Not in favour 5 2 16 
Not examined 11 14 3 
Total 23 23 23 
Of which with empirical analysis   
In favour 1 2 2 
Inconclusive 2 1 1 
Not in favour 5 2 11 
Not examined 9 12 3 
Total 17 17 17 
 
The majority of papers – both theoretical and empirical – we have reviewed are either not in favour 
or inconclusive on the benefits of distribution network ownership unbundling. Along the competition 
and quality dimensions, the papers are relatively equally spread between “in favour”, “inconclusive”, 
and “not in favour”. However, with respect to costs, there are a significant number of papers “not in 
favour”. 
 
Nardi (2012, p.16) states that “…it should be said that ownership unbundling, the core of the third 
package of reforms by the EC, does not show an incontrovertible evidence of better quality and 
capacity expansion…”. 
 
Jara-Diaz et al. (2004, p.1009) conclude that “The results obtained show that the market transaction 
costs are far from negligible and should be taken into account in the analysis of vertical 
disintegration.” 
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In their discussion of the New Zealand reforms, Shen & Yang (2012, p.135) conclude that 
“…unbundling does not seem to have facilitated greater competition in electricity generation sector, 
which has been the subject of several anti-competitive complaints since 2003. In the retail sector, 
the creation of vertically integrated gentailers11 probably didn’t improve the competition situation 
in retail.” 
 
What has been the New Zealand and Dutch experience? 
New Zealand 
The 1998 Electricity Industry Reform Act (EIRA) required, amongst other policy measures, the 
ownership unbundling of distribution networks from retail activities. The objective of the EIRA was 
to improve efficiency and consumer welfare through increased competition, and prevent cross-
subsidization between retail and networks. Following the introduction of the EIRA, most electricity 
distribution companies quickly sold their retail businesses (by April 1999). The newly-formed 
retailers all merged with generators, forming so-called “gentailers”. Together the five largest 
gentailers accounted for ~99% of the retail market in 2005.12 
 
Following a Ministerial Review in 2009, after steady complaints about abuse of market power and 
high prices, the EIRA was repealed, the regulator was strengthened, and ownership separation rules 
were relaxed. One of the provisions was to allow network operators to re-enter the retail market 
under certain conditions, as they were seen as “natural” players, given existing relationships with 
customers, familiarity with the energy sector, local presence, and brand recognition. 
 
Netherlands 
The Network Management Act (‘Splitsingswet’) was passed in 2006 with the intention of improving 
retail competition and network quality. The Act prohibits distribution network companies from being 
in the same corporate group as companies engaged in the production, trade or supply of electricity or 
gas in the Netherlands. Further, the ownership of distribution networks and shares in distribution 
companies must be in the hands of the Dutch state or other state bodies (e.g. provinces, 
municipalities). The original deadline for Essent, Nuon, Eneco and Delta – the existing integrated 
large Dutch energy companies whose shares were held by municipalities and provinces – to comply 
with the ownership unbundling requirements was 1 January 2011. 
 
Nuon and Essent sold their production and supply businesses in 2009 to Vattenfall and RWE 
respectively. The resulting provincial/municipal-owned network companies became Alliander (Nuon) 
and Enexis (Essent). Eneco and Delta (as well as Essent, regardless of its split up) undertook lengthy 
                                                             
11 Gentailers refers to companies that merged generation and retail activities. 
12 Nillesen & Pollitt (2011). 
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legal proceedings – ultimately unsuccessful – against the Dutch state. Finally, in 2017 Eneco 
implemented the unbundling requirements in a manner whereby its shareholders have shares in two 
companies, Eneco and the distribution company Stedin. Delta sold its network group to Stedin. 
 
Examining the impact 
To examine the impact of ownership separation we collected data to test whether competition and 
quality improved, and whether costs fell. To examine the effects on retail competition we collected 
data on: (i) Retail market concentration (HHI index13), (ii) Concentration ratio of the top 3 retail 
players (CR3), (iii) Retail margins, and (iv) Switching rates between retailers. To examine the effects 
on network quality we collected data on: (i) Outage duration (SAIDI14), and (ii) Outage frequency 
(SAIFI15). To examine the effects on costs we collected data on (i) One-off costs, and (ii) structural 
costs/ efficiency.  
 
Table 4. Competition, Quality and Cost data for New Zealand pre- and post-unbundling16 
New Zealand 
 
Pre 1998 Post 1998 Change Stat. Sign.17 
Competition HHI (#) 667 2044 +1377 Y 
CR3 (%) 37.2% 69.8% +32.6% Y 
Gross retail profit margin (%) 21.1% 22.2% +1.1% N 
Change in switching rate (%) 0.0% 1.1% +1.1% N 
Quality SAIDI (minutes) 124.8 77.4 - 47.4 Y 
SAIFI (#) 6.1 7.3 +1.2 Y 
Costs Network Costs (NZ$/kWh, 2007 
prices) 
2.10 1.60 - 0.50 Y 
Distribution gross margin 48.9% 61.8% +12.8% Y 
 
The data from New Zealand demonstrate that ownership unbundling did not have a positive effect on 
competition. In fact, competition decreased: the combined market share of the three largest retailers 
increased from 37 percent to 70 percent and the HHI tripled to 2044, because of the vertical 
integration between generators and the newly created independent retailers, creating so-called 
“gentailers”.  
 
The data show an increase in the gross profit margin of retailers and increase in the rate of switching, 
but the difference pre- and post-unbundling is not statistically significant. There was a large 
improvement in the average duration of outages (SAIDI) immediately following unbundling.  
                                                             
13 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which measures the degree of concentration by calculating the square of the market share of each firm and 
then summing the resulting numbers. It can range from close to zero to 10,000.  
14 System Average Interruption Duration Index, which is the average outage duration per customer. 
15 System Average Interruption Frequency Index, which is the average number of interruptions per customer. 
16 Pre-1998 covers 1995-1998, and post-1998 covers 1999-2006.  
17 Student’s t-test, 90% confidence interval. 
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At the same time the operational costs of the distribution companies decreased significantly by 
approximately 25% per kWh. However, these cost reductions were not passed on to consumers in the 
form of lower tariffs as demonstrated by the increase in distribution gross margins by almost 13 
percent. 
 
The one-off transaction costs associated with the ownership unbundling are estimated at EUR 130 
per customer (today’s prices), based on information from the three main players at the time in New 
Zealand (Powerco, Vector, and United Networks), which represented approximately half the total 
market18. In the case of Powerco there was a loss of approximately NZ$10mln on the disposal of 
generation assets. Vector incurred one off losses of approximately NZ$51mln on the sale of electricity 
contracts associated with the retail business. Finally, United Networks incurred one-off costs of 
approximately NZ$42mln due to restructuring costs and the loss on the sale of an electricity contract.   
 
Our empirical evidence demonstrates that the benefits do not appear to outweigh the costs by a wide 
enough margin to justify interfering in the ownership structure of companies. On the positive side, 
ownership unbundling in New Zealand led to substantial cost reductions and increases in quality of 
service. On the negative side overall competition was reduced, prices rose as cost reductions were not 
passed on the end-users, and there were substantial one-off transactions costs involved. In recent 
years, the rules on ownership unbundling have been relaxed to allow distribution companies to own 
and operate generation and be active in retail – under certain conditions. The question for New 
Zealand remains whether a strict regulator enforcing a proven regulatory regime (such as the CPI-X 
price control regime that is practised in many other countries) could, in reality, have achieved more 
than the current results demonstrate. 
 
Table 5. Competition, Quality and Cost data for the Netherlands pre- and post-unbundling19 
Netherlands 
 
Pre 2009 Post 2009 Delta Stat. Sign. 
Competition HHI 2291 2268 -23 N 
CR3 81,1% 82,1% 1,0% N 
Gross retail profit margin 9,9% 13,2% 3,2% N 
Change in switching rate 1,5% 0,7% -0,8% N 
Quality SAIDI 25,1 21,8 -3,4 N 
SAIFI 0,4 0,3 -0,04 N 
Costs Network Costs n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Distribution gross margin 45,0% 46,4% 1,3% N 
 
The data from the Netherlands are inconclusive on the impact of ownership unbundling – the 
differences pre- and post-unbundling are not statistically significant. Ownership unbundling of the 
                                                             
18 Nillesen & Pollitt (2011). 
19 Pre-2009 covers 2006-2009, and post-2009 covers 2009-2017. 
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distribution networks did not have the desired effects that were intended by the policy measure. We 
do not observe an increase in competition, although the data suggests it has deteriorated since 2009. 
The quality of the networks does seem to have improved, but statistically there is no difference pre- 
and post-unbundling. Finally, distribution costs (margins) have increased slightly, although – again – 
the change is not statistically significant. 
 
The one-off transaction costs associated with the ownership unbundling are estimated at EUR 70 per 
customer (today’s prices), based on the observed one-off cost of unbundling Alliander from Nuon 
(EUR 137 million between 2008-10). The unbundling also resulted in lower credit ratings, which 
impact borrowing costs and access to financing. The integrated Nuon had an A+ credit rating, but 
following unbundling in 2009, the rating for Alliander (the distribution company) was downgraded 
A, and the remaining generation and retail business was downgraded to BBB+. In the case of Essent 
(2009), the overall rating was A. Following unbundling Enexis (the distribution company) 
maintained this rating, whereas the generation and retail business was downgraded to A-. Eneco had 
an overall A- rating in 2017. Following unbundling Stedin (the distribution company) maintained this 
rating, whereas the generation and retail business was downgraded to BBB+. The cost of capital, as a 
result of lower credit ratings, will be higher for the two unbundled companies combined than for the 
previously integrated company, assuming equal borrowing behaviour – given the non-linear 
relationship between credit ratings and credit spreads. Based on Hennink (2016) we estimate that the 
average credit spread loss was approximately 15 basis points. This is equivalent to EUR 2 per 
customer per year in additional costs.20 
 
The data for the Netherlands do not show a significant impact of ownership unbundling on quality or 
competition. There is no difference pre- and post-unbundling. However, there were clear one-off and 
structural costs involved with unbundling. Thus on balance, the expected, but disputed, benefits have 
largely not materialised, whereas the costs of unbundling, have materialised and are significant. 
Additionally, as the Netherlands implemented this form of unbundling unilaterally, many foreign 
players – with network assets – are active in retail and other commercial activities (approximately 60 
percent of retail customers are served by a company that owns networks outside the Netherlands). 
Thus, creating an un-level playing field nationally as well as on a European level, rather than levelling 
the playing field. If network companies could have been sold, they too may well have passed into the 
foreign ownership of bundled international companies. 
 
Overall conclusions 
                                                             
20 Based on total loan portfolio of EUR 11bn at time of unbundling of Nuon, Essent, Eneco, and Delta, and based on total 
customer portfolio of 8mln. 
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The evidence from the Netherlands and New Zealand shows that it is highly questionable whether 
forced ownership unbundling of distribution networks is beneficial for quality and/ or retail 
competition, and could even be negative, whereas the associated one-off and structural costs are both 
significant and certain. The New Zealand experience demonstrates that a structural intervention can 
result in unintended side-effects –i.e. from one form of integration (distribution and retail) to 
another form of integration (generation and retail) and could actually reduce competition. The 
Netherlands on the other hand shows that unilateral structural interventions, without similar 
measures at a European level, where markets are integrated, leads to an un-level playing field and 
does not change the status quo in terms of competition and quality. Either way one-off and structural 
costs are passed on to consumers.  
 
From a policy perspective, it is thus advisable to consider other policy measures to improve 
competition in retail, improve the quality of the network and drive down monopoly network costs. 
Measures that could be considered are (i) strengthening the regulatory framework and the regulator 
(e.g. extending the legal remit, increasing the budget), (ii) decreasing or removing barriers to entry 
for retail activities (e.g. permitting, contracting, financial requirements, arrears procedures, 
marketing rules, etc.), (iii) further ring-fencing of distribution activities (e.g. separate name and 
branding from holding company, financial and reporting requirements, independent decision-
making and governance, etc.), and (iv) improving transparency for end-users (e.g. price comparison 
websites, data transparency on quality, competition, and financial metrics). The latter is one of the 
key focus areas for the European Commission and leading regulators, such as the UK’s, Ofgem.  
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